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of the whole Church. But it was not until three hundred years after the Council of Toledo that any controversy arose between the two communions. And then, when in character, interests, and modes of life, the people of the East and West had drifted apart, when the active and arrogant ambition of the Roman see had roused the jealousy of Constantinople, the question of the Procession was recurred to as a recent doctrinal centre around which more worldly and personal causes of discord might array themselves. As between the Greek Church and the Anglican or American, the feud is an anachronism, and for the separation between us to continue without an effort made by either party to remove the barrier—as it were, only carelessly left up—is surely a reproach to both. We may admit that the Greek position with regard to articles of faith is technically the safest and best, and such admission should lead them to recognize and assent to the Augustinian doctrine of the Western Church as, however irregularly introduced, unquestionably the true, and the crowning and completing truth of the great doctrine of the Trinity.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER I.

The Causality of the Ego being checked by a non-Ego is posited as Impulse—the Check of the non-Ego as a Material World, and from the positing of both a Tendency of the Ego to overcome that check is posited.

In Book First we have considered immediate external perception as a causality of the presupposed absolute life through its immediate being. How far this view will prevail in our Second Book will shortly appear. Nevertheless it is evident that we must commence our investigation with such a causality, and hence we do so now, though in another manner. It is, however, to be remembered, that the word Being is here

taken strictly to signify an absolutely upon-itself-reposing being.

1. Let us then assume that such a causality of life through its immediate being is checked: what will then arise in the checked life? That causality, in so far as it is in the life, can surely not be annihilated itself; only its manifestation can be checked; that causality or determined activity and freedom remains in the life, but in a manner as a causality which has no causality. How do we term this in language? I believe, an *Impulse*. Hence through the checking of the causality there arises in life an impulse; and this is the first place where we have deduced, in its proper connection and from its possibility, an independent being of mere and separate freedom, which in our first book we merely postulated. If we ascribe to life an actual causality, freedom always must immediately and inseparably dissolve in the being produced by it, and can have no separate being of its own at all.

2. An independent being of freedom is, according to our previous results, consciousness. Hence there must arise in life, under the above condition, a consciousness of the impulse by virtue of a limitation. Now, an immediate and self-made consciousness of an actual limitation is called *Feeling*, and the general faculty of such a consciousness is called *Sensuousness*: and since in the present instance consciousness is directed upon the actual condition of life itself, this feeling is a feeling of self, and this sensuousness an *inner* sensuousness.

I add this remark: that which thus limits life can be held to be, firstly, a *force*, and a force stronger than the life, and which, as opposing itself to life, must then be posited outside of it as an independent being; which assumption is the basis of an objective dogmatism, a transcending beyond free life. But it may, perhaps, also be held to be a limitation within that life itself, not however in so far as that life is free, but in a higher being of that life, in relation to which that being of the life whereof we have hitherto spoken would then be only a lower and subordinated being; an assertion, which, if proved, would cancel the above dogmatism and found an immanent idealism.

3. Life has now been elevated above its stage of immediate

causality into the region of consciousness. Hence if there really is an impulse in the life it must have immediate causality in that same region of consciousness. But how will consciousness be able to connect with this feeling of an impulse, and what manner of consciousness will it be when it thus connects? Let us investigate this.

First of all, life contains absolutely through its being freedom a determined faculty; and this faculty has arrived at an independent existence only through the being checked of its immediate causality, since in its unchecked causality it was always evaporating into and flowing together with being. Now since every independent being of freedom results in consciousness, the check produces immediately, together with the consciousness of the impulse, a consciousness of the faculty; with this distinction, that the latter, as not expressing an actual condition but merely a possible activity of life, is called by us, not feeling, as we call the impulse, but contemplation.

Now let us stop at this contemplation of the real faculty to have causality within the sphere of being. It is, as we have seen, a faculty to progress within time through a series of conditions to the intended end. It is this faculty which is to arise on the occasion of an impulse to exercise real causality, and which is to enter contemplation immediately when it thus arises.

The matter stands thus: in this state of affairs, immediately free life is absolutely checked, and cannot progress a single step within the sphere of being. Let us call this limit, which at the same time expresses the intended causality, D. Now this D it cannot immediately attain, being checked. But there may be a point, A, which life is able to produce through immediate causality, and if this point A is produced life may be able to produce another point, B—A being the condition of the realization of B; and again, B being produced, life may be able to realize C, and thus, finally, the originally intended D. If a contemplation or conception of this series arises in life, it must therein behold its own faculty to produce D.

Now this faculty to produce D lay undoubtedly concealed in life and in its absolute being originally; but that it has

now become an actual faculty of life, completely within its free power, and that having thus gotten the faculty within its power, life can at once proceed to realize it, is effected solely by means of the conception life has now attained of it. Only through the conception has life gotten possession of this faculty, for before the conception it had not got it; and we here obtain an insight into the very important proposition, that the conception liberates and can become the ground of an actual faculty. Nay, the very superiority of consciousness over unconscious nature consists in this, that the latter always works blindly whatever it can produce, whereas the former can moderate its work by conceptions and can regulate them according to a rule.

4. As soon as the impulse to have causality exists and continues, there arises in consciousness a desire to form the just described conception of a possible causality to produce a certain end from the contemplation of the faculty in general. The question now is, through what is this forming of such a conception conditioned? I maintain that, besides the already described contemplation of the faculty in general, it is conditioned also by an image of the checking power, or resistance; for if the conception of that possible causality is to arise in the mind—which it does by means of quiet reflection and consideration—the faculty as well as the resistance must be taken hold of by the mind, compared with each other and calculated, until it is found that a certain direction of the faculty will necessarily conquer the resistance. But how does such an image of the resistance arise? Evidently it is not a matter of feeling, for feeling involves only the impulse, which can lead at the utmost to the conception of a limitation; nor of contemplation, for contemplation is directed only upon the faculty. We know this image as the condition of the conception of our possible causality; but this conception is a product of free imagination, which is here—supposing a knowledge of the faculty as well as of the resistance—together production, and consciously and considerably productive, since it proceeds in accordance with the rule given it by both premises. Thus it appears that the image of the resistance must also be created by productive imagination, not consciously however—since itself is not intended to be

created, but only that the creation thereof is conditioned by it—but blindly, and absolutely in consequence of the impulse which craves its satisfaction. In short, in producing this image of a resistance, the productive power of imagination must have causality absolutely through its being, i. e. as a productive power of imagination.

5. How, then, will such an image result? Firstly, as that of an absolute resistance, and hence as posited outside of the Ego into the sphere of Being itself, since Being itself is opposed to life or to the Ego. This positing outside is precisely what we have characterized in Book First as objective thinking. Secondly, as the *image* of a resistance in an image; for it is resistance only in an image and its other relations, whereof hereafter, belong to feeling and cannot enter the image from that feeling; hence as resisting that very imaging and annulling its freedom.

For let us consider, that here, where imaging first begins, we have still the whole infinite freedom of imaging or absolute positing. This freedom is limited in its infinity and this limitation is imaged. Hence there are in this image two elements in reciprocal relation and opposition with each other: 1. The infinite faculty of positing, grasped in the unity of the image, and which we have above described as *Extension*—an empty extension, which, as the image of the faculty itself, is everywhere penetrable by, and transparent to, the Ego; 2. The opposition to this infinite faculty of positing, namely, just the same kind of an infinite positing on the part of the resistance, whereby that transparency and penetrability are cancelled. The whole, which arises from these two components, is the image of *matter*.

But again, the image of the resistance is most certainly *posited*. Hence there must be pictured also an opposition to this positing; otherwise that image would not be the image of a resistance. It is posited, through the positing of the Ego generally, as *being*; but now the resistance must, moreover, posit itself with this its being; and this its own being which the resistance posits together with that being, which it derives from the general positing of the Ego, results in a further determined being, or a quality.

Let us make clear this latter fact by a further and pro-

founder consideration of the external sense. The external sense is, according to the above, a limitation of productive imagination through the self-positing of a resistance generally. Thus the collective sense, feeling or the sense of touch, is nothing but the power of imagination to extend, in a state of limitedness. Through this sense we perceive matter as impenetrable. Now we say at present nothing about this sense as furnishing, besides this impenetrability, still other qualities of matter: warmth, coldness, &c. The easiest to be comprehended sense for quality is sight, which is distinguished from feeling as a collective sense, that the latter expresses only the positing in the act, whereas seeing is the image of the positedness, and of a positedness which is transparent to itself as such. "I see an object" signifies: "The positing of it is completed and I am limited to its positedness." But I do not see through the object signified: the inner condition of the object has not been posited through me, hence is also not known to me, but is posited through the object itself. The limit of this my positing and of the itself-positing of the object is then characterized by a further determination of my seeing, which is ascribed to the object; that is, my seeing is no longer a pure seeing, but the seeing of a color, as the further determination of pure seeing.

These three components form an organic whole amongst themselves, as has already been proved in the first book; and hence it is absolutely impossible that an external objective being should be formed without having sensuous qualities and being immaterial. Hence it is also impossible that matter can be without quality, or that a quality can be otherwise than adherent to a material body.

6. With this investigation our whole view is changed and expanded. In our first book we considered what we then called external perception, in its own triplicity as a for-itself-existing and separate affair. But now we have found it to be a mere link of a greater organic whole, consciousness. For the synthetic period, which we have described, consists of the following three chief components: 1. A feeling—namely, of an impulse; 2. A contemplation—namely, of the real faculty to have causality within the sphere of being; and 3. An image of the resistance. And since this latter image is produced

by the free and absolutely productive power of imagination, without consciousness of freedom, we may very properly call the whole labor in this imaging a *thinking*, since this new view brings even that which formerly we called sensuous affection and contemplation into the one general sphere of thinking.

7. Now let us ask: wherein lies the focus of external perception when we consider it as a separate matter; that is to say, in what condition of it doth life manifest itself? Evidently in the creating of the image. Not the contemplation of extension, which occurs in it, is the focus and central point of its condition; this extension is merely imaged and objectively posited, and when thus posited, an opposition is given to it. Again: not sensuousness is that focus and central point; for sensuousness is only the real point of conflict of the opposites, and as such it also is not immediate, but is objectively posited. Finally: the third component of external perception, the positing, is certainly immediate, since it is the act of imaging or the creating of an image; but it is also posited in the same undivided moment as objective, thus becoming the particular sense for quality, as has been illustrated in the above example of seeing. Hence the whole external perception is not a consciousness at all, but simply an object of consciousness, created by the absolute production of the power of imagination for consciousness. Thus it appears that the thinking which occurs in it is a double thinking, being firstly an actual thinking, as the creating of an image, and secondly a thought thinking, as the objectivated sense for quality; and the contemplation which occurs in it is likewise double, being firstly an actual contemplation, in the creation of extension, and secondly a contemplated contemplation, in that the freedom of it finds a resistance in matter.

Thus, then, the external sense is not an actual sense, but merely the image of the only true sense which remains, of the internal sense. All this might, in fact, have been discovered in mere observation from the circumstance that space as well as the external sense generally is posited outside of the real internal essence of the Ego, the external sense being even embodied into a tool of the senses.

8. Thus the matter stands, therefore. That act of the productive power of imagination cannot, however, arise to consciousness, but melts together immediately with its product. Hence external perception appears to be not an object of consciousness, such as we have shown it to be, but as a true consciousness, and moreover as an immediate and unconditioned consciousness; and thus it happens that the external world is made to appear to ordinary consciousness as an immediate object of consciousness. Now, how have we proceeded that we should have arrived at an insight of the opposite as the truth? We have through means of thinking gathered up external perception into a higher connection, and thus have brought the connecting link, which remains hidden to common consciousness, before our artificially created consciousness. Only thus, indeed, could that insight have been arrived at. Hence whosoever does not undertake this thinking together with us, or, though trying to do so, is not penetrated by its evidence because he does not proceed in the right manner, simply does not get that insight; and all his asserting, getting angry, and averring that he cannot do better, helps him nought. We know it right well, and moreover can prove to him, which he cannot do, that he really cannot look at the matter other than in the way he does, simply because he does not fulfil the conditions of the other view. Should some one, however, interpret our proposition as asserting that we merely imagine things—as indeed some pretended philosophers have actually interpreted it—he would thereby simply exhibit his infinite lack of understanding, his absolute incapacity to be taught, and to enter into other ideas than those he already possesses, and to take hold of two thoughts in such a manner as not to have forgotten the first when he gets to the second. We *imagine* in the higher regions of freedom, where we can also leave off imagining. But that imaging, whereof we have spoken, we cannot leave off at all under the presupposition of an impulse which we shall likely find to belong absolutely to the life of consciousness. Such an imaging is absolutely necessary, and for that very reason its result forces itself upon us. And thus, I think, we have deduced also external perception.

9. The clear result is this: that which has been suggested

by the relation of life has here been under consideration, and which may perhaps remain as the only true, namely, a *limitation* of life, is not at all touched in the object of external perception. That object is a mere opposition to the power of imagination, and is not at all anything by itself, as indeed it does not pretend to be; it is simply the product of a relation to another, to the power of imagination. For surely that through which the thing really exists, and hence can alone enter into connection with us, and which therefore must surely constitute its essence, is its force or *power*; but power is nothing material, nor manifests itself to any external sense; it is simply thought. Hence this power, something altogether unsensuous and supersensuous, were the real thing. What, then, can this space-filling matter claim to be, with its qualities, and how can it ever pass for the real thing?

10. Nevertheless the preliminary question arises here, requiring however, also, only a preliminary answer at present: how is such an image of a resistance usually connected in its general form with the conception of the desired causality? Evidently thus: the whole resistance, to which the impulse relates in its totality and which we seek to get at in parts by proceeding through its various conditions, must be together, and in this, its being together, it is posited in space. In it is, at the same time and as one, that which afterwards in time becomes a many-fold and a succession. Hence the problem is to hunt up in space a point—corresponding to the A described in 3—wherein the causality may commence. For instance: in matter, this resisting power to be overcome is the connection of the parts, and this connection is to be broken first in one point, and from that one to the next.

11. The image of the immediate causality of the Ego is a straight line; hence also all such immediate causality appears as occurring in lines—pressure, impact, &c. If an unsurmountable resistance occurs, the causality moves off in another straight line, and the result is a straight-lined angle. Causality in curved lines occurs only mediately and with considerateness, according to a rule: for instance, around a given centre; whereas the straight line breaks out immediately and without any considerateness, being indeed the very outbreak of free construction. Curvedness is the exact

opposite of freedom, or its limitation; for which reason, indeed, universal space is necessarily figured as a globe.

People have inquired after the ground of the three dimensions of space. Now, firstly, all that is needed is to get at the correct conception of dimension, which will show itself as soon as we shall exhibit its ground. Secondly, it is simply needed to know where to look for this ground; namely, not in the region of conceptions, but of contemplations; for here is a mere contemplation, and the problem is a limitation of contemplation. "Show me the ground of the three dimensions" signifies nothing but: "Put me on a stand-point where this contemplation will necessarily occur to me." This stand-point is, for instance, not that of the point; for from me as a centre an infinite number of lines are possible, and if these were called dimensions space would have an infinite number of dimensions. The stand-point of the required contemplation is rather that of the line as the image of freedom, and hence also of time. This line (freedom), having but one dimension, must be limited by the above resistance in all possible ways. But there are three such ways: it is limited in length at both ends, in breadth again at both ends, whereby space changes from the line into a plane, and finally in height and depth, whereby space changes from a plane to a geometrical body. These are the three possible directions in which to reconstruct original space, that is, if we start from and presuppose the line. Hence, in true opposition to the image of the Ego's causality, space has dimensions, and three of them.

12. We have called external perception generally a *thinking*; previously we said that it was a production of an absolute power of imaging. Hence in so far as we hold both propositions seriously, which we do, we consider all thinking as producing through an absolute power of imaging, and *vice versa*. Thinking is, therefore, nothing passive, receptive, or anything like that.—If former philosophers had made the conception of thinking clear in this way, they would have necessarily ere this put Philosophy on the right track.—Above, we described thinking as a going out of an inner and immediate consciousness. But this inner is feeling and contemplation, both as the immediate being of freedom, and is thus immediate consciousness. Now we say thinking goes out of it. In what manner? Certainly not in the way of Be-

ing, which indeed does not occur here at all, but in the manner of consciousness, which does occur here. But since this is a going out of immediate consciousness, it must be an imaging, and moreover an absolute imaging, a pure creating of a new consciousness. To be sure, a creating according to a rule, and by no means blind and lawless, as those assume who understand us to say that we merely imagine things.

This established conception of thinking will be found to confirm itself altogether. Here we particularly think a resistance of the productive power of imagination, or thinking itself in its most universal form; hence we have here the absolutely first thinking. Productive imagination produces itself—of course, in an image—and images a resistance to this thus produced itself. This is, in short, the here-occurring function of thinking, or of the absolute power of imaging; which power is here immanent, transcendent, remaining in and going out of itself.

With another kind of thinking, of which we shall speak hereafter, it will be different. In it the power of imaging will image not itself, but another faculty given to it before in contemplation, and will image an opposition to this faculty, in which latter function alone it is pure thinking.

13. We also in philosophizing, simply as such, must think; that is, produce absolutely through the power of imaging.

What we have just said may be divided into two chief parts. Firstly, we had to note: under such and such a presupposition (of an impulse, &c.), a picture of a resistance must be created. This "must" expresses that another thinking will connect with the first one, as the presupposed thinking, immediately and as inseparable from it; hence this "must" expresses that through the immediate causality of thinking itself the second thinking will grow out of the first one without any action on the part of freedom; and thus the second link must have arisen — if our assertion is correct — in every one of our readers who has thought the first link correctly, and must so have arisen without any act of his own freedom. The desired evidence must have taken hold of him immediately. It is quite otherwise with the second part of what has been said, namely, with the question: what will this image of a resistance result in?